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Policing the Virtual Red Light District 
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNET PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING 
INTRODUCTION 
“IM [sic] READY TO SATISFY ALL YOUR SINFULL 
[sic] NEEDS . . . 150 HHR, 200 1HR, 350 2HRS, 500 3HRS.”1 A 
quick search through the adult services section of an average 
classified-ads website reveals hundreds of advertisements like 
this. This advertisement from the “Erotic Services” section of 
Classifiedads.com—among hundreds of others on the same 
website and other classified-ads websites—is the reason why 
some refer to the Internet as the “virtual red-light district.”2 In 
fact, Craigslist, the online classified-ads giant, recently came 
under the microscope of local and national law enforcement 
agencies and prosecutors because it hosted ads like this. 
Known as the “Wal-Mart”3 of online sex trafficking, Craigslist, 
as well as those in charge of the site, began to face intense 
scrutiny from the public in 2010 because some believed that the 
website’s operators knowingly allowed users to offer sex for 
money in the site’s “Adult Services” section.4  
Despite this belief, the legal options for deterring 
websites from hosting such content were—and continue to be—
limited. Under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
  
 1 Destiny, Sexy Mixed Bombshell Ready for You, CLASSIFIEDADS.COM, 
http://adult.classifiedads.com/erotic_services-ad4516424.htm (last updated May 22, 
2011) (on file with author).  
 2 David Wright et al., ‘Craigslist: Site for Sex Slaves’ Story Save’s Girl’s Life, 
ABC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/popular-website-craigslist-outlet-
sex-trafficking-child-exploitation/story?id=11367581.  
 3 Steve Turnam & Amber Lyon, Sold on Craigslist: Critics Say Sex Ad 
Crackdown Inadequate, CNN (Aug. 3, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-03/justice/ 
craigslist.sex.ads_1_adult-ads-services-ads-craigslist?_s=PM:CRIME (quoting Andrea 
Powell of FAIR). 
 4 In early August 2010, CNN reporter Amber Lyon approached Craigslist’s 
founder, Craig Newmark, outside of a university where he was giving an unrelated talk. 
Lyon showed Newmark several ads that she had found on the “Adult Services” section of 
Craigslist in which it is clear that women are selling themselves for money. Amber Lyon, 
Craigslist and the Sex Trade, CNN (Aug. 25, 2010, 6:31 PM), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/ 
2010/08/25/video-craigslist-and-the-sex-trade-2/?iref=allsearch. 
824 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
(CDA), websites essentially have immunity from liability—civil 
and criminal5—for unlawful postings by third parties.6 This 
immunity comes from section 230 of the CDA, entitled 
“Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive 
material.”7 Under this section, websites that merely provide an 
interactive computer service8 “shall [not] be treated as the 
publisher or speaker” of any information posted by third-party 
users, where the third-party users are considered the 
“information content providers.”9  
Courts agree that they cannot make websites that act as 
mere hosts of information, not creators, answer to plaintiffs 
“under state law” for offensive or illegal information posted by 
third-party users.10 Specifically, section 230 protects interactive 
computer services, including websites, from liability as 
publishers or speakers of information created by third parties.11 
Therefore, classified-ads websites remain immune from 
  
 5 It should be noted that section 230 provides an explicit carve-out for 
federal criminal liability. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2006). Prostitution, however, is 
generally regulated by the states, and, as far as criminal liability goes, classifieds 
websites like Craigslist have, thus far, “escap[ed] criminal prosecution.” John E.D. 
Larkin, Criminal and Civil Liability for User Generated Content: Craigslist, a Case 
Study, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 85, 87 (2010). It is true that prosecutors could bring 
criminal charges against classifieds websites for violations of federal anti-prostitution 
laws, but it is highly unlikely that those prosecutors could meet the burden of showing 
that classifieds websites have “the requisite knowledge and mens rea to be prosecuted.” 
Id. at 93.  
 6 47 U.S.C. § 230. Although there is a statutory carve-out for federal crimes, id. 
§ 230(e)(1), criminal prosecution would be a stretch here, especially on the elements of intent 
or mens rea. See Larkin, supra note 5, at 91-100 (discussing the shortcomings of potential 
criminal prosecution strategies for Craigslist’s “Adult Services” section).  
 7 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
 8 “The definition of an ‘interactive computer service’ (ICS) is very broad 
under the CDA, including: ‘any information service, system, or access software provider 
that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.’” Lori 
E. Lesser, Social Network and Blogs, 1001 PLI/Pat 101, 117 (2010); 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(f)(2). Courts have interpreted interactive computer services to include websites 
as well. Lesser, supra, at 117 (citing Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 
F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007)). “The term ‘information content provider’ means any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development 
of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
 9 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 10 Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294 (D.N.H. 2008). 
“[O]ther courts that have addressed these issues have generally interpreted Section 230 
immunity broadly, so as to effectuate Congress’s ‘policy choice . . . not to deter harmful 
online speech through the . . . route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as 
intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.’” Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d at 
418 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir.1997)). 
 11 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). For the definition of an “interactive computer 
service,” see supra note 8. 
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liability for hosting content created entirely by third parties, 
which includes sex-sales advertisements.12  
As a society that condemns, and has outlawed, sex 
trafficking and prostitution (collectively, “sex sales”), we should 
not have to rely on societal pressures—from open letters to 
media reports13—to hold classified-ads websites accountable for 
the rampant criminal activity facilitated through the sites’ 
adult-services sections. Although many have tried, plaintiffs 
have had little luck getting around section 230.14 Despite the 
development of creative litigation strategies, including (1) the 
Estoppel Approach,15 (2) the Grokster Approach,16 (3) the 
Roommates.com Approach,17 and (4) the Default-Injunction 
Approach,18 each strategy has its own weaknesses, and thus, 
none of them will effectively combat the problem of online sex 
sales. Therefore, Congress should amend section 230 in order 
to obtain a more effective, long-term solution to these problems. 
The Commercial Sex Distribution Amendment (CSDA) would 
preserve traditional distributor liability for classified-ads 
websites. Under such an amendment, classified-ads websites 
would be liable for unlawful sex postings by third parties if the 
websites were notified about the postings but took no steps to 
remove the postings, because they would then become 
distributors that knowingly distribute illegal content. As a 
“distributor,” the website would lose the shield of section 230 
“publisher” immunity.19  
This note is divided into five parts. Part I contains a 
brief history of prostitution and sex trafficking, including their 
Internet evolution. Part II discusses the policy reasons for, and 
the purpose of, section 230. Part III explores the four litigation 
  
 12 See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(where the court found Craigslist immune from civil liability for third-party sex-sales 
advertisements under CDA section 230).  
 13 See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text. 
 14 See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328; Dart, 665 F. 
Supp. 2d at 966. 
 15 See infra Part III.A. 
 16 See infra Part III.B. 
 17 See infra Part III.C. 
 18 See infra Part III.D. 
 19 As the law stands now, courts have held that interactive computer services 
that conduct no filtering are, at most, distributors. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 
776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). More importantly, courts have also decided that 
section 230 eliminates traditional distributor liability for websites, despite the fact that 
the statute only mentions publisher liability. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332; see infra notes 
148-64 and accompanying text. 
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strategies mentioned above and explains why each strategy 
ultimately fails to provide plaintiffs with relief on the merits. 
Part IV presents a legislative solution to online-prostitution 
and sex-trafficking problems. This solution, the CSDA, finds its 
foundation in common-law principles of distributor liability for 
the distribution of tortious materials.20 Finally, Part V 
addresses the potential problems with the CSDA and explains 
how those problems can be overcome. 
I. PUTTING PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING IN 
CONTEXT 
Prostitution, perhaps the “‘oldest profession’ in the 
world,”21 is defined as “[t]he act or practice of engaging in 
sexual activity for money or its equivalent.”22 In contrast, sex 
trafficking is defined as using force, fraud, or coercion to cause 
a person to “engage in a commercial sex act”—or in the case of 
a person under eighteen years of age, simply causing that 
person to engage in a commercial sex act.23 In other words, sex 
trafficking is forced prostitution, or alternatively, facilitating 
prostitution with a minor.  
Although it is often hard to distinguish between voluntary 
prostitution and involuntary sex trafficking, the two have 
coexisted in the United States since the eighteenth century.24 
  
 20 Under tort law, a distributor “who intentionally and unreasonably fails to 
remove defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his 
possession or under his control is subject to liability for its continued publication.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977). As one author notes, these kinds of 
defamation cases “typically involve a defendant who, though not the author of the 
defamatory statement in question, has implicitly ratified that statement by his failure 
to remove it from a place of prominence on his property.” Gregory M. Dickinson, Note, 
An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity Under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 863, 877 (2010). 
 21 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Wharton, Note, A New Paradigm for Human 
Trafficking: Shifting the Focus from Prostitution to Exploitation in the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 753, 759 (2010) (citing NILS 
JOHAN RINGDAL, LOVE FOR SALE: A WORLD HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION 4 (Richard Daly 
trans., Grove Press 1st ed. 2004) (1997)); R. BARRI FLOWERS, THE PROSTITUTION OF 
WOMEN AND GIRLS 5 (1998).  
 22 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 576 (3d Pocket ed. 2006). Additionally, 
prostitution exists in several forms, such as street prostitution, escort services, and 
brothels. Ronald Weitzer, The Politics of Prostitution in America, in SEX FOR SALE 159, 
163-65 (Ronald Weitzer ed., 2000). 
 23 Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A § 1591 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011). 
 24 Prostitution and the Trafficking of Women, IOWA STATE UNIV., 
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~womenstu/ws201student/prostitution/homepage.html 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2011). 
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During its earliest days, “the incidence of prostitution was low”25 
in America, partly because adultery was extremely common and 
partly because men could often have sex with slaves or 
indentured servants rather than prostitutes.26 In the early 
nineteenth century, as cities and industry expanded, so too did 
the business of prostitution.27 Until the end of World War I, 
prostitution existed in plain view in many American cities.28  
But prostitution did not thrive for long. During World 
War II, law enforcement and the general public began to see 
prostitutes as a dangerous threat to soldiers and laborers, and 
reformers made efforts to decrease the open business of 
prostitution.29 After that, in the 1950s and 1960s, police arrested 
prostitutes more frequently, men did not hire prostitutes as 
often, organized crime found more lucrative sources of revenue, 
and the entire business was largely forced underground.30  
Over the past fifty years, however, the sexual culture in 
America has changed dramatically—and so has prostitution. In 
the 1960s, a “sexual revolution” began, and pornography 
became available for mass consumption for the first time.31 As 
pornography became more pervasive in American society, so 
too did prostitution, because, as one author writes, 
“prostitution is the enacted version of pornography.”32 As a 
result, by the 1990s, prostitution was essentially “normalized” 
in our society.33 The prevalence of sex in the media, combined 
with the increasingly regular entrance of women in the labor 
force led to an increase in prostitution because “sex industries” 
could offer women “higher wages than the labor force.”34 Rather 
than being a woman’s only work option, prostitution arguably 
became a choice for some women;35 and not only a choice for 
women in lower socio-economic classes, but a choice for 
educated, upper middle class women as well.36 Accordingly, 
  
 25 T. C. Esselstyn, Prostitution in the United States, 376 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 123, 126 (1968).  
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 127. 
 31 KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 56 (1995). 
 32 Id. at 57. 
 33 Id. at 58-59. 
 34 Id. at 123. 
 35 Valerie Jenness, From Sex as Sin to Sex as Work: COYOTE and the 
Reorganization of Prostitution as a Social Problem, 37 SOC. PROBLEMS 403, 405-06 (1990). 
 36 Consider Ashley Dupré, a prostitute from an upper middle class suburb in 
New Jersey, who arguably chose the profession of her own free will. See Kimberly 
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“[s]ince 1970, the most dramatic changes in prostitution have 
been its industrialization, normalization, and widespread 
global diffusion.”37  
However, the rise in prostitution during the last thirty 
years of the twentieth century pales in comparison to the rise 
in prostitution over the last decade alone. Today, “[s]exual 
freedom is now regarded by many as a basic liberty, and the 
freedoms to buy and sell sexual services are arguably included 
in sexual freedom.”38 As one author correctly predicted in 1998, 
“the number of girls and women entering the profession will 
likely swell in the coming years as we enter the new century.”39  
A major reason for the swell in prostitution and sex 
trafficking over the past decade is the advancement of the 
Internet.40 The Internet has made access to commercial sex 
essentially effortless.41 From the privacy of their own homes, 
Internet users can sell and purchase sex instantly. The 
“anonymity and community aspect to the Internet makes it a 
powerful tool for traffickers, buyers, and facilitators.”42  
Although sex between consenting adults can be 
harmless, the problem in the online sex-sales context lies in 
that not all the sex-sales postings on classified-ads websites are 
voluntary, and, based on the content of the postings alone, it is 
nearly impossible to identify who is offering sex willingly 
(voluntary prostitutes) and who is being forced to sell her body 
against her will (victims of sex trafficking). Additionally, even 
if many of the ads are posted by willing adult participants and 
do not constitute sex trafficking, the sale of sex for money is 
illegal in all fifty states.43  
An open letter to Craig Newmark—the founder of 
Craigslist—sent by two victims of online sex trafficking shed 
  
Launier & Katie Escherich, Ashley Dupré Exclusive: My Side of the Story, ABCNEWS 
20/20 (Nov. 19, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=6280407&page=1. 
 37 BARRY, supra note 31, at 122. 
 38 PETER DE MARNEFFE, LIBERALISM AND PROSTITUTION 108 (2010). 
 39 FLOWERS, supra note 21, at 15. 
 40 LINDA A. SMITH ET AL., SHARED HOPE INT’L, THE NATIONAL REPORT ON DOMESTIC 
MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING: AMERICA’S PROSTITUTED CHILDREN 19 (2009), available at 
http://www.sharedhope.org/Portals/0/Documents/SHI_National_Report_on_DMST_2009.pdf. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.  
 43 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney 2008). Prostitution is legal 
only in some counties in Nevada in which state-regulated brothels exist. Weitzer, supra 
note 22, at 159; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.345 (LexisNexis 2005). 
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light on the problems of involuntary prostitution.44 In that letter, 
the two teenage girls describe some of the horrors they suffered 
while they were being sold for sex through the “Adult Services” 
section of Craigslist. One of the girls explains that she was “sold 
for sex by the hour at truck stops and cheap motels” and that 
she was threatened, abused, and repeatedly raped.45 Meanwhile, 
the man who trafficked one of the girls online made an easy 
$30,000 each month.46 Undoubtedly other children and teenagers 
have suffered the same fate. Thus, online classified-ads websites 
facilitate violence and criminal activity that involves unwilling 
children and teens by continually allowing third-party users to 
advertise the sale of sex for money.47 Moreover, even if those 
third-party users are willing adults, the underlying conduct is 
still unlawful, and often dangerous. 
Seventeen attorneys general in 2010 recognized the 
problems inherent in online sex sales, with the tension between 
law enforcement and the classified-ads websites finally 
reaching its breaking point on August 24, 2010. On that date, 
the seventeen attorneys general sent a letter to Craig 
Newmark and Jim Buckmaster, the founder and general 
counsel of Craigslist, respectively, and requested the 
immediate removal of the “Adult Services” section of 
Craigslist.48 In a move that surprised many, on September 4, 
2010, Craigslist voluntarily replaced its “Adult Services” 
section with a black text box that read “censored.”49 Even more 
surprisingly, several days later, the section was removed 
entirely.50 Although many people acknowledge the removal of 
the adult-services section on Craigslist as a victory in the fight 
against online prostitution and sex trafficking, others do not 
  
 44 Open letter from AK and MC to Craig Newmark, founder of Craigslist, 
available at http://www.rebeccaproject.org/dearcraig/Dear_Craig.pdf (hereinafter “Craigslist 
Open Letter”).  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Letter from Attorneys General to Craig Newmark (Aug. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/CraigslistLetter. The attorneys general from Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia, cited 
concern for “innocent women and children,” as well as Craigslist’s unique position as the 
“only player in the sex industry who is in a position to stop these ads before they are 
published,” as reasons for their request for removal. Id.  
 49 Adult Services Censored on Craigslist, CNN (Sept. 4, 2010), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-04/justice/craigslist.censored_1_prostitution-ads-craigslist-
ceo-jim-buckmaster-founder-craig-newmark?_s=PM:CRIME. 
 50 Michael A. Lindenberger, Craigslist Comes Clean: No More ‘Adult Services,’ Ever, 
TIME (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2019499,00.html.  
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understand the problems surrounding such solicitation.51 
Craigslist removed its “Adult Services” section voluntarily, but 
it is important to note that, under the CDA and relevant case 
law, Craigslist was not legally required to do so.52  
Acknowledgment of Craigslist’s voluntary compliance as 
a complete victory fails to adequately appreciate the problems 
that surround sex solicitation in the first place. Additionally, 
for victims of sex trafficking and law enforcement alike, the 
voluntary removal of the Craigslist section does little to solve 
the problem of online sex sales. Sex-sales postings are still 
available on Craigslist—simply under other sections like 
“Casual Encounters”53—and they are widely available on other 
classified-ads websites that continue to host “Adult” or “Erotic” 
services sections, such as Classifiedads.com, Webcosmo.com, 
Backpage.com, and more.54 As one commentator recognized, 
when Craigslist removed its “Adult Services” section, other 
classified-ads websites began “actively soliciting traffic from 
the former “Adult Services” section of Craigslist.”55  
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 230 
In 1996, with the enactment of the CDA, Congress made 
its first attempt to substantially regulate Internet activity.56 In 
response to the ever-increasing presence of online sex sales, as 
  
 51 Some people argue that adult or erotic services sections on classifieds sites 
actually make it easier to combat online sex crimes because the listings are all consolidated 
in one place, making them easily identifiable for law enforcement agencies. See danah boyd, 
How Censoring Craigslist Helps Pimps, Child Traffickers and Other Abusive Scumbags, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/danah-boyd/how-
censoring-craigslist-_b_706789.html.  
 52 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006); see, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 
2d 961, 967-69 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that Craigslist was immune from civil liability 
for commercial sex postings created by third parties); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil 
Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that Craigslist was immune from liability under section 230 for discriminatory housing 
postings created by third parties); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff barred by section 230 from bringing suit against 
defendant for third-party defamatory postings).  
 53 Casual Encounters, CRAIGSLIST.ORG, http://newyork.craigslist.org/cas/ (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2011).  
 54 Erotic Services, CLASSIFIEDADS.COM, http://www.classifiedads.com/erotic_ 
services-99.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2011); Erotic Services, WEBCOSMO, 
http://www.webcosmo.com/listing/search.aspx?countryId=1&gId=5&dId=95 (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2011); Adult Jobs, BACKPAGE.COM, http://newyork.backpage.com/AdultJobs/ 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2011). 
 55 Laura Sydell, Beyond Craigslist, Many Markets for Sex Traffickers, NPR 
(Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129863089.  
 56 The CDA was added as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. 
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well as other unlawful activity, Congress enacted section 22357 
and section 230 of the CDA.58 Specifically, Congress enacted 
section 223 to protect minors from indecent and obscene 
materials found on the Internet.59 Under subsections (a) and (d) 
of section 223, it became a crime for someone to knowingly 
transmit “obscene, indecent, or patently offensive material to 
minors below the age of eighteen.”60 The American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) found these provisions at odds with 
the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and brought 
suit to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.61 In a 1997 
decision, the Supreme Court sided with the ACLU and declared 
subsections (a) and (d) of section 223 unconstitutional.62 The 
Court cited concerns about the “vague contours” of the statute, 
including the fact that Congress did not define the terms 
“indecent” or “patently offensive” and held that the indecency 
and obscenity provisions of the CDA placed an overly broad 
content-based restriction on free speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.63 As a result of this decision, the only enforceable 
provision of the CDA that remains is section 230. 
Congress originally enacted section 230 to limit liability 
of interactive computer services for defamatory postings 
created by third parties. More specifically, section 230 is “often 
cast as a legislative response to the Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 
[New York State Supreme Court] case.”64 In that case, the court 
held that a website and its operators were liable for libelous 
statements made by third parties on a bulletin-board portion of 
the site. Since the website’s administrators screened—and 
either approved or rejected—all potential posts, the court found 
that the website had acted as the publisher of the statements 
  
 57 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996). 
 58 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006); see also AARON SCHWABACH, INTERNET AND THE 
LAW: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIETY, AND COMPROMISES 45 (2006) (“The Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) was the first law passed by Congress attempting to address 
the availability of pornography and obscene materials to minors over the Internet.”). 
 59 Vasiliki Pagidas, Case Note, First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—Provisions 
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 Intended to Protect Minors from Exposure to 
Indecent and Patently Offensive Material on the Internet Violate the First Amendment—Reno 
v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 975, 980 (1998).  
 60 Pagidas, supra note 59, at 980-81.  
 61 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996).  
 62 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
 63 Id. at 870-79. The Court further notes that the interest in protecting 
children from harmful materials on the Internet “does not justify an unnecessarily 
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.” Id. at 875.  
 64 Brian J. McBrearty, Who’s Responsible? Website Immunity Under the 
Communications Decency Act and the Partial Creation or Development of Online 
Content, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 831 (2009).  
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at issue.65 Under this line of reasoning, a website’s liability 
increased the more it monitored posts by third parties because 
such monitoring effectively made a website a publisher, rather 
than a distributor, of information created and submitted by 
third parties. Therefore, Congress enacted section 230 to 
“remove the disincentives to selfregulation [sic] created by the 
Stratton Oakmont decision”66 and to shield websites from 
traditional publisher liability. Recall that the pertinent parts of 
section 230 immunize interactive computer services, which 
include classified-ads websites, from being “treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”67  
Unfortunately, many courts have read section 230 so 
broadly that they have granted immunity even to those 
interactive computer services that do next to nothing to 
monitor offensive or unlawful third-party content.68 As the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opined in 2003, “[S]o long as a 
third party willingly provides the essential published content, 
the interactive service provider [or website] receives full 
immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection 
process.”69 The justification for such a broad reading of section 
230 stems from the fact that “billions of users continually 
transmit enormous quantities of information” through the 
Internet, and although some of the information transmitted 
may be illegal, “[t]here is no way for the [interactive service 
providers] to police all of the content stored on and passing 
through their systems.”70 Therefore, in the commercial sex 
context, so long as third-party users create the sex-sales 
listings on classified-ads websites, the websites—as interactive 
computer services, and not information content providers—
have immunity from civil and criminal liability, whether they 
monitor the ads posted or not.  
The 2009 case Dart v. Craigslist, Inc.,71 illustrates this 
immunity. In Dart, a county sheriff filed suit against Craigslist 
  
 65 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 
323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).  
 66 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 67 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).  
 68 See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328 (holding that interactive service providers 
are immune from tort liability for information created by third parties); Gentry v. 
eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 712-16 (Ct. App. 2002); see also McBrearty, supra 
note 64, at 834-36. 
 69 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 70 SCHWABACH, supra note 58, at 190-91. 
 71 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009).  
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and claimed that the “Adult Services” section of the site 
constituted a public nuisance because the content contained in 
the section violated federal, state, and local prostitution laws.72 
The court dismissed the suit on the ground that the complaint 
plainly treated “Craigslist as the publisher or speaker of the 
information created by its users,” and that under section 230(c), 
the provider of an interactive computer service, such as 
Craigslist, had immunity and could not be treated as the 
developer of information created by third parties.73 Although the 
Dart Court noted that the majority of courts take this broad 
view of immunity for websites,74 not all courts subscribe to such a 
view, especially when faced with more innovative strategies 
employed by plaintiffs. 
III. LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR CIRCUMVENTING SECTION 
230 
Admittedly, plaintiffs have developed creative litigation 
strategies in attempts to circumvent section 230. The following 
four approaches—Estoppel, Grokster, Roommates.com, and 
Default-Injunction—all have significant weaknesses inherent 
in relevant case law that impede their effectiveness in 
combating online sex sales.  
A. The Estoppel Approach 
After severing ties with her boyfriend in 2004, Cecilia 
Barnes began receiving phone calls, e-mails, and personal 
visits from male strangers who wanted sex.75 Unbeknownst to 
Barnes, her ex-boyfriend was posting false profiles in her name 
through Yahoo!, in which he listed all of Barnes’s contact 
information, nude photographs of Barnes, and an open 
invitation for sex.76 Once Barnes figured out what was 
happening, she contacted Yahoo! Inc. and requested removal of 
the false profiles.77 Barnes contacted Yahoo four separate times 
before anyone from the company got back to her.78 When 
Yahoo’s director of communications finally contacted Barnes, 
  
 72 Id. at 963. 
 73 Id. at 969. 
 74 Id. at 965. 
 75 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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the director told Barnes that the profiles would be removed.79 
The profiles remained online for two months after that 
conversation, and, as a result, Barnes brought suit against 
Yahoo. Barnes claimed that she relied on Yahoo’s promise to 
remove the profiles to her detriment, which constituted a 
promissory estoppel claim under Oregon law.80  
The court held that section 230 did not bar Barnes’s 
promissory estoppel claim because the duty allegedly violated by 
Yahoo did not derive from its “status or conduct as a publisher 
or speaker,” but rather “the duty [Yahoo] allegedly violated 
[sprung] from a contract—an enforceable promise.”81 The court 
continued, “Contract liability here would come not from Yahoo’s 
publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be 
legally obligated to do something, which happens to be removal 
of material from publication.”82 Although Barnes asked Yahoo to 
edit information, a role that traditionally belongs to publishers, 
this editorial function had no effect on the website’s liability, 
because the underlying claim was one based in contract law, not 
publisher liability and tort law.83 
Although this approach worked for Barnes, the 
promissory estoppel approach does not easily transfer to the 
online classifieds context. A classified-ads website would only 
face liability under the estoppel approach if a person, such as a 
law enforcement official or an individual featured in one of the 
ads without her consent, contacted the website to request 
removal of a particular commercial-sex ad and the website 
agreed to do so but then failed to follow through with the 
removal. Websites could avoid exposure to contractual liability 
by ignoring removal requests and thereby avoid forming a 
contract with anyone who requests removal. As the Barnes 
Court articulated, a website can avoid contract liability by 
simply “disclaim[ing] any intention to be bound.”84 
Alternatively, websites could simply refuse to remove any ads 
  
 79 Id. at 1099. 
 80 Id. Promissory estoppel is a contract law principle under which “a promise 
made without consideration may nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the 
promisor should have reasonably expected the promisee to rely on the promise and if 
the promisee did actually rely on the promise to his or her detriment.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 253; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
 81 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1107-09.  
 84 Id. at 1108. The court points out that a “general monitoring policy,” or 
“attempt to help a particular person, on the part of an interactive computer service” 
does not give rise to contract liability under a promissory estoppel approach. Id.  
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that do not contain clearly illegal content, and the First 
Amendment will protect the websites.85 Therefore, the 
promissory estoppel approach actually creates an incentive for 
websites to refuse to cooperate with removal requests. 
Finally, even if a plaintiff can establish contractual 
liability against a classifieds website, the remedy will be 
limited to a reliance interest, or to what “justice requires,”86 and 
thus it is not a sufficient deterrent in the long run for 
classified-ads websites that host sex-sales advertisements. 
Classified-ads websites generate millions of dollars in revenue 
from their adult-services sections,87 and the payment of limited 
contract damages would have little impact on those earnings. 
Thus, the promissory estoppel approach does little to solve the 
problem of website liability for online sex sales, and in fact may 
create perverse incentives for websites to make no promises 
regarding the monitoring or removal of postings.  
B. The Grokster Approach 
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, the 
Supreme Court held Grokster, a software manufacturer, liable for 
the illegal acts of third-party users of its software because the 
Court found that Grokster had induced the users to commit the 
unlawful acts in question.88 Grokster developed and distributed 
digital file-sharing software. The software allowed users to share 
digital files, such as music and movies, directly between end-user 
computers without going through a central server.89 The Grokster 
software allowed users to share many kinds of files with one 
another, but the majority of files being shared were copyrighted 
music and video files that users were sharing without 
authorization.90 As a result of this activity, various music 
companies, motion picture studios, and publishers who owned the 
relevant copyrights brought suit against Grokster and alleged 
that Grokster “knowingly and intentionally distributed [its] 
software to enable users to reproduce and distribute the 
  
 85 For a discussion of relevant First Amendment issues see infra Part V. 
 86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).  
 87 Before Craigslist shutdown its “Adult Services” section, it was estimated 
that they would make more than $36 million from that section alone due to fees they 
charged users to post in that section. Brad Stone, Sex Ads Seen Adding Revenue to 
Craigslist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/04/26/technology/26craigslist.html. 
 88 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).  
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 920. 
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copyrighted works in violation” of federal copyright law.91 The 
copyright holders wanted to hold Grokster liable simply for 
manufacturing and distributing its software.92 
Grokster relied on the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal93 for the proposition that 
Grokster’s software was capable of noninfringing uses, and 
therefore Grokster should escape liability.94 In Sony, the Court 
held that a VCR manufacturer and distributor was not liable for 
secondary copyright infringement where the third-party users of 
the VCR recorded copyrighted materials without authorization 
because the VCR was developed and distributed primarily for 
“commercially significant noninfringing uses.”95 The Grokster 
Court, however, refused to extend Sony-like immunity to 
Grokster on the ground that, unlike the uses of the VCR, 
Grokster’s software had the primary and intentional purpose to 
share copyrighted works without permission.96 The Court 
ultimately held that “one who distributes a device with the object 
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear 
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, 
is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”97 
Therefore, the Court held Grokster was secondarily liable for 
copyright infringement committed by third-party users.98  
By applying the Grokster approach to online sex sales, 
courts could hold interactive computer services, such as 
Classifiedads.com and Webcosmo.com, secondarily liable for 
third-party postings if those websites “actually [did] something 
  
 91 Id. at 920-21. 
 92 This kind of liability is known as secondary liability. See generally Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). There are two kinds of 
secondary liability: contributory and vicarious. A person may be liable for contributory 
infringement where he has knowledge of direct infringement, and induces, causes, or 
otherwise aids in that activity. Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). A person may be liable for vicarious infringement 
where he has the ability to control infringing activity, but does not do so, and gains a 
direct financial benefit from the infringing activity. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307-08. 
 93 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 94 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 
1029, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 95 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 442, 456. 
 96 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941. 
 97 Id. at 936-37. 
 98 “Although Grokster and StreamCast do not therefore know when 
particular files are copied, a few searches using their software would show what is 
available on the networks the software reaches.” Id. at 922. Regardless of their 
knowledge, or lack thereof, of the infringement being committed by its users, Grokster 
was held liable on a vicarious liability theory, which is defined as “[a] person’s liability 
for an infringing act of someone else, even though the person has not directly 
committed an act of infringement.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 427.  
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to encourage the illegal speech”99 (i.e., induced third parties to 
post ads for commercial sex). Classified-ads websites that 
create specific forums for commercial sex ads under sections 
titled “Adult Services” or “Erotic Services”—and then largely 
turn a blind eye to the content of those sections—allow online 
sex sales to thrive, and thus their operators have induced users 
to violate the law.100 Many classified-ads websites generate 
significant revenue from their adult services sections,101 and 
third-party posters know that they have a place where they can 
post ads for commercial sex without fear of repercussions.  
However, plaintiffs in the online sex-sales context have a 
heavy burden when it comes to presenting evidence to show that 
a classified-ads website actually took steps to induce third 
parties to create illegal postings on the site.102 Most classified-ads 
websites simply set up a forum for third parties to post 
information created entirely by the third-party users.103 As one 
author argues, a website that “simply allows anyone and 
everyone to post content on its service, but does not solicit or 
purposely benefit from any illegal third-party content . . . passes 
the Grokster test, whether the [site] knew about the illegal 
material or not.”104 Therefore, unless classified-ads websites 
solicit illegal sex sales postings, and then benefit from those 
postings, they fall outside of Grokster.105 Moreover, the Court 
held Grokster secondarily liable for acts of third parties in large 
part because Grokster’s software had the primary purpose of 
unlawfully sharing copyrighted works.106 In contrast, most 
classified-ads websites are created for the primary purpose of 
providing a virtual marketplace where people can buy and sell 
legal goods and services—not sex.  
  
 99 Zac Locke, Comment, Asking for It: A Grokster-Based Approach to Internet Sites 
that Distribute Offensive Content, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151, 155-56 (2008). 
 100 Inducement is defined as the “process of enticing or persuading another person 
to take a certain course of action.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 355.  
 101 See supra note 87.  
 102 See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
 103 See, e.g., Create Your Free Ad, CLASSIFIEDADS.COM, http://www.classifiedads.com/ 
post.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2011); Post Ads Free, WEBCOSMO, https://www.webcosmo.com/ 
Post/Post.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
 104 Locke, supra note 99, at 170.  
 105 Some classified-ads websites do in fact generate revenue from their erotic 
services sections by making users pay a fee to create listings in those sections, which 
constitutes a benefit to the site. Most classified-ads websites will pass the Grokster test 
anyway because they arguably do not solicit or encourage the creation of commercial-
sex advertisements. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 
111-14 and accompanying text. 
 106 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 
(2005).  
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Rare exceptions do exist, however, with websites such as 
AdultSearch.com.107 Unlike more general classified-ads websites, 
Adultsearch.com is a forum primarily for sex sales. Users of 
Adultsearch.com have access to thousands of commercial sex 
listings under categories such as “Erotic Services,” “Sex 
Tourism,” “Erotic Massage,” and more.108 Under the Grokster 
test, classified-ads websites established primarily for 
commercial sex postings could face liability for third-party sex 
sales postings because the websites’ creators have the intent to 
encourage online sex sales. However, a judgment against such 
websites would likely have little or no impact in the fight against 
online sex sales because most classified-ads sites devoted purely 
to adult services are established to allow users to find lawful 
casual sexual encounters, that is, sexual encounters that are 
consensual and noncommercial, such as listings for strip clubs.109 
Therefore, only a small number of websites could arguably be 
held liable under a Grokster approach.  
Because most classified-ads websites are created for the 
primary purpose of buying and selling goods and services that 
are legal, and because section 230 provides broad immunity to 
such interactive computer services, the Grokster approach will 
likely fail in allowing plaintiffs to circumvent section 230, just 
as it did in one 2007 defamation lawsuit in Massachusetts.110  
In Universal Communications Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 
plaintiffs sued an interactive computer service for defamatory 
postings created and posted by third parties on the defendant’s 
website.111 Plaintiffs specifically argued that section 230 did not 
shield the defendant-website from liability because “it actively 
induce[d] its subscribers to post unlawful content,” and, under a 
Grokster analogy, the website should be held liable for that 
inducement.112 The court ruled in favor of the defendant-website 
and noted, “It is not at all clear that there is a culpable assistance 
exception to Section 230 immunity,” and even if “active 
inducement could negate Section 230 immunity, it is clear that 
  
 107 ADULTSEARCH, http://www.adultsearch.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).  
 108 Id. 
 109 Even websites like Adultsearch.com include some lawful advertisements 
for adult services such as strip clubs, adult stores, and noncommercial sexual 
encounters. Id. 
 110 See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 414-15 (1st 
Cir. 2007). 
 111 Id. at 415.  
 112 Id. at 421 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005)). 
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[Universal] has not alleged any acts by [the defendant-website] 
that come even close to constituting . . . active inducement.”113 
The Universal Court rejected the Grokster approach in 
the defamation context, and it is likely that plaintiffs in the 
online sex sales context would face similar difficulties in trying 
to show that classified-ads websites took affirmative steps to 
induce third parties to post unlawful commercial sex ads. 
Classified-ads websites function largely as blank forums for 
third-party content, and even with websites such as 
Adultsearch.com, plaintiffs will likely fall short of satisfying the 
Grokster standard. A website that is founded purely for adult 
services does not necessarily indicate that the interactive 
computer service actively induces users to post ads for unlawful 
adult services. In fact, even websites like LocalEscortPages.com 
have policies against users posting such content.114  
Of course, an argument can be made that the mere 
existence of adult services websites, coupled with the websites’ 
allowance of anonymous postings, encourages third parties to 
create commercial sex advertisements when they may not have 
done so prior to the existence of such forums. However, it is 
unlikely that these facts rise to the level of active inducement 
as laid out in the Grokster and Universal cases. Plaintiffs 
would have a nearly impossible time showing that classified-
ads websites have actual intent to encourage users to create 
unlawful adult services advertisements—the websites could 
simply defend themselves by pointing to their “Terms of Use” 
agreements in which they explicitly discourage the creation of 
such ads. Therefore, the Grokster approach is unsatisfactory.  
C. The Roommates.com Approach 
By moving away from an inducement-liability theory, 
and employing an information-creation argument, plaintiffs 
saw some success in a 2008 suit against Roommates.com.115 In 
that case, the Fair Housing Councils of San Fernando Valley 
and San Diego (Councils) successfully brought suit against 
  
 113 Id. Active inducement liability is “predicated on [a defendant] actively 
encouraging (or inducing) infringement through specific acts.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942.  
 114 LocalEscortPages.com’s “Terms of Use” explicitly says that users are 
“entirely responsible” for the content they create, and that users may not post illegal 
content. Terms of Use, LOCALESCORTPAGES.COM, http://www.localescortpages.com/ 
page/terms/0/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
 115 See generally Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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Roommates.com—a roommate matchmaking website—for 
violations of the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA).116 On the 
Roommates.com website, users created personal profiles by 
answering a series of required questions. In answering these 
questions, users were required to disclose information about—
among other things—their “sex, family status and sexual 
orientation.”117 Answers to the required questions had to be 
selected from a prepopulated menu of various options, known as a 
drop-down menu, created by Roommates.com.118 These questions 
had to be answered in order to gain access to the available 
roommate listings on the website.119 Roommates.com also provided 
a comments section for users to add preferences not adequately 
detailed by the pre-selected menus for the required questions. 
From the information disclosed through a user’s answers to the 
required questions, as well as the user’s additional comments, 
Roommates.com would then “steer users” to one another as 
potential roommates based on “the preferences and personal 
characteristics that [the website] itself force[d] subscribers to 
disclose.”120 
The Councils claimed that Roommates.com matched 
roommates based on discriminatory criteria and functioned as 
a “housing broker doing online what it may not lawfully do off-
line” by asking discriminatory questions with respect to 
housing sales or rentals, and then using that information to run 
discriminatory roommate searches, in violation of the FHA.121 
The Councils argued that section 230 immunity did not apply to 
Roommates.com and alleged that the website qualified as an 
information content provider, not just an interactive computer 
service, because it required users to answer discriminatory 
questions, provided a pre-set list of answers to those questions, 
and then used the discriminatory preferences gathered from 
those answers to direct users to like-minded, potential 
roommates.122 The court agreed with the Councils, and held that 
section 230 immunity did not apply to the discriminatory 
questions posed by Roommates.com because the website served 
as “more than a passive transmitter of information provided by 
others; it [was] the developer, at least in part, of that 
  
 116 Id. at 1164. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 1165. 
 119 Id. at 1166. 
 120 Id. at 1167. 
 121 Id. at 1162. 
 122 Id. at 1164-65. 
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information.”123 However, the court limited its holding to the 
questions actually created by Roommates.com. With respect to 
the additional comments section, the site was immune under 
section 230 “because [Roommates.com] published the comments 
as written, [and it] did not provide guidance or urge subscribers 
to input discriminatory preferences.”124  
Local or national law enforcement agencies could apply 
a similar approach to the online sex-sales context and bring suit 
against classified-ads websites that host commercial sex 
postings in violation of state and federal laws by arguing that 
section 230 does not apply to such websites because the sites are 
partial content creators—not just interactive computer 
services—of the postings. However, this argument is weak when 
applied to classified-ads websites because plaintiffs would have 
an incredibly difficult task in showing that classified-ads 
websites, which are mostly blank forums for information created 
entirely by third parties, qualify as developers of sex-sales 
advertisements in even the broadest sense of the word.125 
Classified-ads websites are designed and function more like the 
additional comments section of Roommates.com, rather than the 
required-questions section, because classified-ads websites 
merely publish advertisements created freely by third parties, 
and do not aid in the creation of the posts.  
The weakness of the Roommates.com approach has been 
exposed in several recent cases in which plaintiffs have tried to 
argue that various websites were partial creators or developers of 
the information posted by third parties on the sites, and thus not 
immune from liability under section 230.126 In response to these 
  
 123 Id. at 1166 (noting that “section 230 provides immunity only if the 
interactive computer service does not ‘creat[e] or develop[]’ the information ‘in whole or 
in part’” (citation omitted)).  
 124 Doe II v. Myspace Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 158 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(discussing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174). 
 125 While plaintiffs in Chicago Lawyers’ did not make a Roommates.com 
argument when they sued Craigslist for discriminatory housing postings on the site, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear that Craigslist did not cause unlawful 
postings on its site, and thus Craigslist was not a developer or partial developer of the 
information, but rather just the publisher, and immune under section 230. See generally 
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 
(7th Cir. 2008). Therefore, classified-ads websites designed and operated like Craigslist, 
i.e., as largely blank forums for content created by third parties, likely won’t be found to 
be developers, and the Roommates.com approach will fail. 
 126 See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 
254 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a consumer review website could not be considered an 
information content provider because the site was designed in a neutral way, and 
simply “enable[d] [the] content to be posted online,” unlike Roommates.com); Doe II, 96 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 158-59 (holding that social-networking site Myspace.com could not be 
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arguments, the courts simply distinguish the websites sued from 
Roommates.com, noting that “Roommate’s website [was] designed 
to force subscribers to divulge . . . discriminatory preferences,” 
while the websites at issue simply provide “neutral tools” that 
enable users to independently create postings of their choosing.127 
Therefore, in order to defeat the Roommates.com approach, 
defendants need only distinguish classified-ads websites from the 
questions section of Roommates.com and analogize the sites to the 
additional comments section of Roommates.com.  
Further, plaintiffs would not likely have any more 
success under a Roommates.com approach by arguing that 
classified-ads websites are partial creators of commercial sex 
postings on the ground that the classifieds sites create sections 
titled “Adult Services” or “Erotic Services.” In fact, the Illinois 
sheriff in Dart v. Craigslist, Inc. employed this argument when 
he brought the public nuisance claim against Craigslist.128 The 
sheriff argued that Craigslist caused or induced its users to 
post unlawful commercial sex ads “by having an ‘adult services’ 
category with subsections like ‘w4m’ [women for men] and by 
permitting its users to search through the ads based on [the 
users’] preferences.”129 The court disagreed and noted that 
Craigslist did not cause the creation of unlawful postings on its 
site but rather took steps to warn users against posting such ads 
in the site’s “Terms of Use” agreement.130 The court further stated 
that “[t]he phrase ‘adult,’ even in conjunction with ‘services,’ is not 
unlawful in itself nor does it necessarily call for unlawful content” 
and reasoned that one might post an advertisement for erotic 
dancing, which is a lawful adult service.131  
Accordingly, courts have viewed the Roommates.com 
decision as fact-specific and only applicable to websites that 
assist in the creation of unlawful content on the site. As long as 
  
considered an information content provider for purposes of civil liability because, 
unlike Roommates.com, Myspace.com employed “neutral tools” and lawful questions in 
its profile-creation process for users).  
 127 Doe II, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 158. 
 128 See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 129 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130 Id. at 962. Other classified-ads websites that continue to host adult 
services sections similarly include prohibitions against unlawful commercial sex 
postings in their terms of use. For example, Backpage.com includes a “User Conduct” 
section in its terms of use, and subsection four of the User Conduct policy explicitly 
prohibits the posting of illegal conduct, including “[p]osting any solicitation directly or 
in ‘coded’ fashion for any illegal service exchanging sexual favors for money or other 
valuable consideration.” Terms of Use, BACKPAGE.COM, http://newyork.backpage.com/ 
online/classifieds/Terms (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
 131 Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 968. 
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a classified-ads website does not use pre-populated content to the 
same extent as Roommates.com, where users were forced to 
create illegal content, section 230 applies, and those sites will be 
immune under a Roommates.com theory of liability. In order to 
succeed on a Roommates.com approach, a classifieds site would 
have to qualify as a partial developer of the unlawful sex-sales 
advertisements by hosting adult services sections that force users 
to choose whether they are seeking a woman or a man, a specific 
kind of sexual encounter, and a price range for those services. 
Because most sites do exactly the opposite of this and actually 
warn users against posting such ads, the Roommates.com 
approach will not aid plaintiffs in circumventing section 230.  
D. The Default-Injunction Approach 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects anonymous speech.132 For this reason, Internet users 
may post content on websites anonymously. However, such a 
protection creates a problem when it comes to illegal speech. 
For example, when an anonymous user posts defamatory 
remarks about another person or entity on a website operated by 
an independent interactive computer service, the target of the 
defamatory speech will want to have the content removed from 
the site. Unfortunately, it is difficult, and sometimes even 
impossible to uncover the identity of the anonymous user who 
posted the remarks at issue.133 Moreover, even if the user’s 
identity is known, he or she will rarely show up to court. 
Therefore, victims of defamatory Internet posts have a difficult 
time getting the content removed, especially if a website refuses 
to do so voluntarily,134 because the content creators cannot be 
located, and section 230 shields websites from liability.  
In response to the difficulties presented in removing 
defamatory postings from websites, targets of such postings 
  
 132 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (holding that “an 
identification requirement [for distributing pamphlets] would tend to restrict freedom 
to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression”). 
 133 Courts have adopted various standards for granting motions to obtain 
identifying information of anonymous posters in defamation cases. The most common 
approach is outlined in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 
2009). According to the Brodie Court, plaintiffs must first try to notify the anonymous 
posters about the lawsuit directly. Id. at 457. Next, if the anonymous defendants do not 
respond, the plaintiffs must set out the exact statements at issue, as well as a prima 
facie defamation claim. Id. The court will then conduct a balancing test between the 
anonymous poster’s First Amendment rights against the necessity of disclosure for 
purposes of the defamation claim. Id. 
 134 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.  
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have recently begun to use a litigation tactic that may be called 
the Default-Injunction approach.135 Under this approach, 
victims of defamatory posts bring suit against the third-party 
posters for defamation instead of wasting time by bringing a 
claim directly against the website hosting the defamatory 
content.136 If plaintiffs cannot ascertain the identities of the 
defendant-posters, plaintiffs simply list defendants as “Does.” 
Predictably, defendants in these suits do not show up to defend 
against the claims, and the court then enters a default against 
them. Next, if proper under applicable law, the court will enter 
a permanent injunction against the defaulting defendants, 
which “requir[es] [the defendants] to . . . remove their 
defamatory postings from the websites.”137 Because the 
defendants can be difficult to find, plaintiffs approach the 
“third party providers of the websites to enlist their help in 
deleting the postings.”138 The plaintiffs will show the websites 
the default injunction, and, generally, the websites will 
voluntarily comply.139 As Internet law scholar Eric Goldman 
notes, in order to avoid the litigation costs associated with 
challenging such action, most websites “would speedily comply 
with a default injunction, no questions asked—especially if the 
user is not around to protest the takedown.”140  
Under this approach, law enforcement officials could 
bring suit against anonymous or identifiable users who post 
unlawful sex ads on classified-ads websites in violation of state 
or federal laws. It is unlikely that the defendants will appear in 
  
 135 See, e.g., Blockowicz v. Williams, 675 F. Supp. 2d 912, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
See generally Bobolas v. Does, No. CV-10-2056-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 3923880 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 1, 2010).  
 136 Websites, as service providers, not content creators, are immune from 
liability for the presence of defamatory postings on their sites. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) 
(2006); see, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997). This 
immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230 gives websites little incentive to remove posts. See 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 137 Blockowicz, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 913. As one commentator notes, “[w]ithout 
any defendant there to argue otherwise, the courts seem willing to grant virtually any 
relief requested by the plaintiff.” Eric Goldman, A New Way to Bypass 47 USC 230? 
Default Injunctions and FRCP 65, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Nov. 10, 2009, 11:50 
AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/11/a_new_way_to_by.htm. 
 138 Blockowicz, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
 139 Plaintiffs can serve an injunction on a non-party to a suit if the non-party 
acted in “active concert or participation” with defendant. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(C). 
The major problem here would be proving that websites acted in concert or 
participation with third-party posters. Despite this problem, most websites would 
rather remove the contested material than incur the cost of litigation. See Blockowicz, 
675 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (two of three websites approached by plaintiff removed the 
contested third-party posts).  
 140 Goldman, supra note 137.  
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court to defend against the claims, and the court will enter 
default injunctions against them. From there, law enforcement 
officials could approach the classified-ads websites with default 
injunctions in hand. The sites would then be more likely to 
remove the ads than to expend resources to contest compliance.  
The problem with the Default-Injunction approach, 
however, arises when a website refuses to remove postings 
when approached. This happened in 2009 when a consumer-
review website, RipoffReport.com, refused to take down 
allegedly defamatory content on its site when contacted by the 
target of the content who had obtained a default injunction 
against a third-party poster.141 Under the shield of section 230, 
RipoffReport.com has a strict “no-takedown policy—even if the 
user requests the takedown, and even in the face of a court 
order against the user.”142 In an attempt to force compliance 
with the takedown injunction over RipoffReport.com’s no-
takedown policy, the plaintiffs turned to the court and moved 
for third-party enforcement of the injunction against 
RipoffReport.com.143 In its defense, RipoffReport.com argued 
that section 230 “protects its publication decisions” with 
respect to third-party content, and it need not comply with the 
injunction, because it was not a party to the underlying 
defamation suit and did not act in concert with the poster.144 
The court agreed with RipoffReport.com and found that the 
site145 had too “tenuous” a connection to the third-party users to 
compel “compliance with the court’s permanent injunction.”146 
Despite its holding, the court sympathized with plaintiffs who 
“find themselves the subject of defamatory attacks on the 
[I]nternet yet seemingly have no recourse to have those 
statements removed from the public view.”147  
  
 141 Eric Goldman, Ripoff Report Not Bound by Takedown Injunction Against 
User—Blockowicz v. Williams, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 22, 2009, 6:44 PM), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/12/ripoff_report_n.htm. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See Blockowicz, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
 144 Goldman, supra note 141. “To enforce the injunction against a non-party 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), that party must be acting in concert or 
legally identified (i.e. acting in the capacity of an agent, employee, officer, etc.) with the 
enjoined party.” Blockowicz, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 915 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. 
Homa, 514 F.3d 661, 674 (7th Cir. 2008)).  
 145 Technically, the issue was with Xcentric, the operator of RipoffReport.com. 
See Blockowicz, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
 146 Id. at 916. It is important to note that the “judge’s ruling turned solely on a 
statutory interpretation of FRCP 65,” and not on section 230. Goldman, supra note 141.  
 147 Blockowicz, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 916. 
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The decision by the court in the RipoffReport.com case 
substantially weakened the Default-Injunction approach. 
Under the holding of the district court, classified-ads websites 
need not remove unlawful sex-sales ads created by third 
parties, even if law enforcement obtains a takedown injunction 
against the third-party posters. Law enforcement officials are 
essentially left with no recourse to remove illegal commercial 
sex ads from sites because the websites have immunity from 
direct liability under section 230, and need not comply with 
indirect, Rule-65 injunctions under emerging case law. 
IV. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: THE COMMERCIAL SEX 
DISTRIBUTION AMENDMENT 
Thus far, courts have not provided adequate relief for 
plaintiffs who seek removal of objectionable or unlawful 
content from various websites.148 Although some courts have 
expressed concern about the overly broad reach of section 230,149 
courts generally continue to rule for defendant-websites, 
because section 230 leaves courts’ hands tied. Even when 
plaintiffs have employed litigation strategies such as the 
Estoppel, Grokster, Roommates.com, and Default-Injunction 
approaches, courts have consistently ruled in favor of the 
defendant-websites as interactive computer services and 
publishers, rather than content creators.150 Given the current 
dead-ends for plaintiffs, and the serious social harm that online 
prostitution and sex-trafficking present,151 the legislature 
  
 148 Since its enactment, section 230 has barred two-thirds of all claims against 
websites “who facilitated the publication or distribution of content they believed had 
caused harm.” David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An 
Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 492 (2010).  
 149 See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1998) (“If it 
were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with plaintiffs. . . . But Congress 
has made a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive 
service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content 
prepared by others.”).  
 150 See supra Part III.  
 151 On one hand, the social harms associated with sex-trafficking are fairly 
obvious, as the practice quite literally constitutes a form of child slavery. SMITH ET AL., 
supra note 40, at 4. With sex-trafficking, children are commercially exploited for sex, 
and, in the process, they are physically, psychologically, and sexually abused. See id. 
Congress recognized the social harms created by sex-trafficking, and enacted the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7112 (2006), “to prevent 
victimization, protect victims, and prosecute perpetrators of human trafficking.” Id.  
  On the other hand, the social harms associated with prostitution are much 
less obvious, because, by definition, prostitutes are individuals who have reached the 
age of majority and can consent to sex in exchange for money or other goods. Feminist 
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should take action to amend section 230 in the form of the 
Commercial Sex Distribution Amendment (CSDA) in order to 
better aid law enforcement officials in the fight against online 
prostitution and sex-trafficking.  
The CSDA would carve out a narrow exception to 
section 230 only in the online sex-sales context. Under the 
CSDA, an interactive computer service, such as a classified-ads 
website, would become a distributor once local or national law 
enforcement officials alerted the provider to the presence of 
illegal sex-sales ads152—those ads that advance prostitution or 
sex trafficking153—on the relevant website. Once an interactive 
computer service has actual knowledge of such content and 
thereby becomes a distributor, common-law tort principles of 
distributor liability would apply.154 Under such principles, 
distributors such as booksellers, libraries, and newsstands 
would face liability for the dissemination of tortious materials 
“if they either know or have reason to know of the [tortious] 
nature of their publications,”155 yet continue to distribute those 
  
groups, however, argue that even if prostitution is sometimes consensual, the practice 
nevertheless “represents women’s subordination and degradation in patriarchal 
society.” DEBORAH ROSE BROCK, MAKING WORK, MAKING TROUBLE: PROSTITUTION AS A 
SOCIAL PROBLEM 4 (1998). Further, traditional religious groups argue that prostitution 
“flies in the face of the ideals of monogamy, fidelity, and chastity.” Id. More tangibly, 
social research suggests that there is widespread drug use among prostitutes, a high 
risk of sexually transmitted diseases, malnourishment, and other health problems that 
often go untreated. See Judith Porter & Louis Bonilla, Drug Use, HIV, and the Ecology 
of Street Prostitution, in SEX FOR SALE, supra note 22, at 103. 
 152 The burden of reporting the presence of sex-sales advertisements would 
thus fall on a party with great interest in eliminating such content—law enforcement 
agencies. This strategy is analogous to the takedown requirements under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011). 
Under applicable copyright law, the burden lies with copyright owners to police the 
Internet for instances of infringement, and then, under section 512(c) of the DMCA, the 
copyright owner can report those instances to the relevant websites in order to obtain a 
takedown of the allegedly infringing content. See id. 
 153 The New York Penal Law defines “advances prostitution” as follows: 
A person “advances prostitution” when, acting other than as a prostitute or as a 
patron thereof, he knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage in 
prostitution, procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons or 
premises for prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house 
of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or engages in any other conduct 
designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.15 (McKinney’s 2008).  
 154 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 581 (1977).  
 155 Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The 
Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 590 (2001) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 581 (1977)). Note that distributor liability 
typically arises in the context of defamation, but it can also be extended to the 
distribution of obscene materials. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) 
(holding that local ordinance must contain a knowledge requirement in local ordinance 
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publications anyway. Therefore, a classified-ads website would 
only be liable for commercial sex ads created by third parties if 
they had actual knowledge156 of such ads and took no steps to 
remove the ads. As some commentators have suggested, 
Congress “intended for section 230(c) to override only 
publisher, not distributor, liability.”157 
Without the CSDA, websites may never have to take 
responsibility for third-party commercial sex ads, and countless 
women and children will continue to be exploited through a 
medium that is both cheap and fast. As section 230 case law 
has developed, courts have decided not to apply common-law 
distributor liability principles to the Internet.158 Every court 
that has had an opportunity to distinguish between publisher 
liability and distributor liability under section 230 has declined 
to do so and instead has immunized websites from both 
publisher liability and distributor liability, despite the fact that 
section 230 uses only the word “publisher” and not 
“distributor.”159 For example, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,160 
plaintiff Kenneth Zeran sued America Online (“AOL”) for 
defamation and argued that “[section] 230 immunity eliminates 
only publisher liability, leaving distributor liability intact.”161 
The plaintiff claimed that because he gave AOL notice of the 
defamatory postings, AOL had actual knowledge and was 
therefore subject to distributor liability when it did not remove 
the posts.162 The court disagreed with the plaintiff, holding that 
AOL was immune from both publisher liability and distributor 
liability under section 230 because distributors are a “type of 
  
that held booksellers liable for the distribution of obscene materials). In the online sex-
sales context, the ads are either unlawful on their face, or, if written more subtly, 
constitute tortious content in the form of a public nuisance. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 
665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962-63 (N.D. Ill. 2009).  
 156 Actual knowledge is defined as “[d]irect and clear knowledge, as distinguished 
from constructive knowledge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 403.  
 157 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 n.10 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
 158 Ardia, supra note 148, at 411 (citing Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online 
Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 258 (2006)).  
 159 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027 n.10 (citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 
327, 331-34 (4th Cir. 1997); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 
980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013-17 (Fla. 
2001)). It is important to note, however, that courts have immunized websites from 
distributor liability in defamation suits only, not online prostitution and/or sex-
trafficking. Under the CSDA, traditional publisher liability would be left intact in the 
online sex-sales context only, and the relevant defamation suits would be unaffected.  
 160 Zeran, 129 F.3d 327. 
 161 Id. at 331. 
 162 Id.  
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publisher for purposes of defamation law.”163 The court went on 
to note that, “once a computer service provider receives notice of 
a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a 
traditional publisher,” and therefore immune from liability.164 
Perhaps the Zeran Court rightfully declined to recognize a 
distinction between publisher liability and distributor liability in 
the defamatory-speech context,165 but such a denial makes little 
sense in the world of online sex sales, and ought not to apply 
there. This move has left law enforcement without recourse 
against websites that have knowledge of their role as hosts of 
unlawful sex-sales ads, and yet do nothing to remove those ads.166  
If forced to apply the Zeran theory to the online sex-
sales context, websites would be immune from liability, even if 
they knowingly hosted commercial sex ads after law 
enforcement officials notified the websites of the existence of 
such unlawful content. Therefore, if faced with a case in which 
law enforcement agents could show that they had notified a 
website of the presence of commercial sex ads on the site, and 
further, that the website had failed to remove the content, then 
the website could be liable as a distributor under the CSDA. 
Pursuant to liability as a distributor, classified-ads websites 
that violate the CSDA would be subject to substantial 
monetary penalties, which would serve as incentive to comply 
with takedown requests by law enforcement.  
The CSDA would preserve the underlying policy goals of 
section 230167 because it would still not treat interactive 
computer services, such as classified-ads websites, as 
  
 163 Id. at 332. 
 164 Id. 
 165 It can be argued that Congress intended to preclude distributor liability 
with section 230, even though not explicitly mentioned in the statute, because such 
preclusion would be consistent with the underlying policy goals of the statute, 
including those mentioned in note 167, infra. At the same time, Congress recognizes 
the importance of combating prostitution and sex trafficking, as evidenced through 
their enactment of federal laws like the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 
U.S.C. §§ 7101-7112 (2006). Therefore, while Congress may have intended to preclude 
distributor liability in the defamatory-speech context, it is unlikely that Congress 
intended to limit liability for websites that knowingly disseminate or distribute 
commercial sex ads.  
 166 Essentially, law enforcement has no way to combat online sex sales. Going 
after individual facilitators is nearly impossible for the reasons discussed above. See 
supra note 133 and accompanying text.  
 167 Policy goals of section 230 include—among other things—preserving the 
“vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation,” and 
encouraging the “development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2), (3) (2006).  
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publishers of content created by third parties, but law 
enforcement would have an effective tool for combating online 
sex sales where websites have knowledge of the unlawful 
content. By creating a distinction between publishers and 
distributors in the online sex-sales context, it is possible to 
impose liability on classified-ads websites that allow online sex 
sales to thrive without undermining the policy goals168 and 
textual construction of section 230,169 or imposing unreasonable 
restrictions on Internet speech.170 Not only is distributor 
liability much more limited than publisher liability,171 but the 
CSDA would limit interactive computer service liability even 
further by restricting its application to the online sex-sales 
context only. Therefore, classified-ads websites could still host 
a free-flow of third-party information without fear that they 
need to monitor every detail of every ad that is posted—a task 
that is likely impossible on the Internet. Instead, law 
enforcement officials, who have the relevant knowledge and 
expertise about unlawful sexual activities, as well as proper 
resources to better assess the possible presence of commercial 
sex ads, would conduct monitoring and investigations.  
If law enforcement officials could meet a preponderance 
of the evidence standard to show that certain ads were more 
likely than not illegal commercial sex ads, then the classified-
ads website would have to remove the ads. In other words, law 
enforcement would need to present the websites with a 
reasonable amount of evidence to support a takedown order. 
Moreover, if the officials could show that illegal sex ads had a 
substantial and pervasive presence within an adult services 
section of a classified-ads website, the website would have to 
remove the section entirely, which would solve the systemic 
problem at its root.172  
  
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. § 230.  
 170 For a discussion of First Amendment issues see infra Part V.  
 171 Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act, 
CITIZEN MEDIA L. PROJECT (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/ 
immunity-online-publishers-under-communications-decency-act (“Distributor liability is 
much more limited [than publisher liability]. . . . The concern is that it would be impossible 
for distributors to read every publication before they sell or distribute it, and that as a 
result, distributors would engage in excessive self-censorship.”).  
 172 In order to make a showing of the substantial and pervasive presence of 
unlawful commercial sex advertisements on classified-ads websites, law enforcement 
officials would indeed be required to conduct more in-depth investigations, including 
contacting the creators of suspicious listings, conducting sting operations, and more. If 
the evidence gathered from an investigation could support the proposition that a 
majority of the online advertisements at the time of the investigation were advocating 
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Further, the CSDA would be a cost-effective way to 
control online prostitution and sex trafficking for classified-ads 
websites. The amendment would not require websites to screen 
third-party content because law enforcement would be 
responsible for that task. By putting the burden of the cost of 
screening on law enforcement, the CSDA would allow websites 
to continue to operate and host information created by third 
parties without fear of being held liable for information that 
the sites do not create.  
Finally, in order to protect the free-flow of information on 
the Internet by shielding websites from costly litigation and by 
respecting the constitutional rights of third-party users, the 
CSDA could contain a procedural takedown provision akin to the 
takedown provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.173  
This provision would require interactive computer 
services to designate a takedown agent to whom parties could 
direct all takedown requests of illegal sex-sales advertisements. 
Further, the provision would outline the substantive 
requirements for the takedown requests created by law 
enforcement officials and mandate that the officials clearly 
identify the content at issue, the content’s precise location on 
the website, and a statement of good faith belief in the illegality 
of the content. Law enforcement officials who ordered takedowns 
in bad faith could face fines. Additionally, the officials would be 
required to attempt to notify the author of the post about the 
takedown request. Upon receipt of a takedown notification, 
absent voluntary removal by the author, the website would then 
be required to remove the material at issue after ten business 
days but before fourteen business days. This would give the 
content creator time to object. Content creators may object to 
any takedown notification with a counter-notification containing 
a statement of good faith in the legality of the content. Upon 
receipt of a counter-notification, the website would be required 
to restore the content within ten days. At that point, law 
enforcement would have to file suit against the content creator 
directly in order to get the content removed.  
The notification provision of the CSDA would give law 
enforcement officials and content creators a clear procedural 
framework for remedies under the statute. If a user’s lawful 
advertisement were accidentally removed, the user would have a 
  
prostitution and/or sex trafficking, then the classified-ads website would have to 
remove the section.  
 173 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011).  
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forum in which he could challenge the takedown.174 More 
importantly, with this system, the classified-ads websites would 
not be hampered with having to police their pages, nor liable for 
good-faith removal of certain sex-sales advertisements. 
Additionally, law enforcement agencies would have incentive to 
do their due diligence before issuing takedown orders, or else 
risk facing fines.  
V. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CSDA 
Of course, some potential problems exist with the 
practical application of the CSDA. First, this solution remains 
costly for law enforcement entities. As the Illinois sheriff in 
Dart attested, his local law enforcement unit expended 
approximately 3120 man-hours and $105,081 during an eleven-
month span in which they conducted “prostitution stings using 
information culled from advertisements in Craigslist’s erotic-
services category,” and made 156 arrests from those 
operations.175 As a remedy, the sheriff not only sought to enjoin 
Craigslist from continuing to host commercial sex ads, but he 
also wanted “to recoup the money his department ha[d] spent 
policing Craigslist-related prostitution, compensatory damages, 
and punitive damages.”176  
Law enforcement officials like the plaintiff in Dart may 
object to the CSDA on the ground that it still requires their 
agencies to expend considerable time and resources to fight 
online sex sales. Given this burden, law enforcement agencies 
might question whether it even makes sense to approach the 
classified-ads websites. After all, if the agencies confirm the 
existence of unlawful commercial sex ads through exhaustive 
investigation, they could just go after the third-party creators of 
the ads directly (they may have to do so as part of their 
investigation in the first place).177 It is at precisely this point, 
however, that the CSDA would benefit law enforcement. Under 
the amendment, law enforcement agencies need only satisfy a 
preponderance of the evidence standard—more likely than not—
  
 174 Such a user could also make out a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
deprivation of his First Amendment rights.  
 175 Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962-63 (N.D. Ill. 2009).  
 176 Id. at 963. 
 177 “[R]eflecting the problem of ambiguous posts, Sheriff Dart allege[d] that in 
a typical sting[,] an arrest is made only after the person identified in the ad offers an 
undercover officer sex for money.” Id. at 962 & n.3. In other words, law enforcement 
has to go through the effort of setting up an undercover sting operation to confirm the 
illegality of commercial sex advertisements on classified-ads websites in the first place.  
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when they challenge the legality of sex-based classified 
advertisements. Such a standard does not require sting 
operations or other evidence needed to meet the level of a 
reasonable-doubt standard, but rather it only requires factual 
information that tends to show that a given advertisement is one 
for sex in exchange for money, not just a therapeutic massage.  
For example, an advertisement such as the one quoted 
at the beginning of this note178 likely needs no further evidence 
than the text of the ad itself. Admittedly, not all ads are quite 
so obvious, and some may require more evidentiary support. 
For instance, the sheriff in Dart, through investigation of and 
expertise in online adult services advertisements, explained 
that third-party users often post commercial sex ads using code 
language, such as substituting the word “roses” for the word 
“dollars.”179 In that instance, a law enforcement official would 
only need to attach an affidavit to a copy of the advertisement 
in which he or she explains the use of code words that online 
facilitators commonly use to advertise sex sales. Additionally, 
many advertisements contain phone numbers, names or 
nicknames, and photographs, and can be traced to a specific IP 
address. Where law enforcement has evidence of an 
advertisement for sex sales, and the officials gather 
information associated with that ad, they could raise red flags 
where the same information is subsequently listed in new ads 
that appear to advertise commercial sex. 
Obviously, many advertisements are so ambiguous that 
the evidentiary task would prove more difficult. More 
importantly, third-party users could just get more creative with 
their use of code words or protective language. One such user on 
Classifiedads.com went so far as to post the following disclaimer: 
Donation exchanged for legal adult personal services such as 
modeling, escorting or massages are simply for time, companionship, 
and related stated service. Anything else that may or may not occur is 
a matter of personal preference between two or more consenting 
adults of legal age and is not contracted for nor is it requested for in 
any matter. This is NOT an offer of or for prostitution. Fees charged 
are for time spent only. I do reserve the right to decline appointments 
and individuals as I deem necessary. By contacting me either through 
phone or email you agree to this contract and these terms and hereby 
  
 178 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
 179 Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (referring to plaintiff’s complaint).  
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acknowledge that you are not a part of any law enforcement agency 
using this advertisement for entrapment or arrest.180 
Despite the fact that this user lists a price and includes 
nearly nude photographs in her advertisement,181 the possibility 
exists that the ad is truly for a lawful escort service. This 
precise problem makes the fight against online sex sales so 
difficult. If the woman in the disclaimer-laden advertisement is 
advertising a lawful service, then the First Amendment 
protects her post.182  
Unfortunately, some constitutionally protected speech 
will inevitably be swallowed up by the CSDA, especially in 
cases like that of Craigslist in which entire adult services 
sections are removed from classified-ads websites. However, 
“there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—
cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its 
face and so prohibiting” the government “from enforcing the 
statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to 
proscribe.”183 If it is indeed true that, before removing its “Adult 
Services” section, Craigslist was “the single largest source for 
prostitution, including child exploitation, in the country,”184 
then takedowns of entire adult services sections on classified-
ads websites will dramatically reduce the incidence of online 
prostitution and sex trafficking. Such regulation would send a 
message that classified-ads websites will no longer be free-for-
all forums in which illegal activity will be tolerated.  
Finally, the CSDA faces a free-speech challenge from 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The 
First Amendment dictates that Congress “shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”185 The freedom 
implicated by this amendment is one of the most important for 
citizens of the United States.186 The right of free speech, as 
Justice Brandeis once said, is “fundamental.”187 Statutes that 
attempt to limit such fundamental rights are therefore subject 
  
 180 Post by PaRiiS, CLASSIFIEDADS.COM, http://adult.classifiedads.com/erotic_ 
services-ad4136067.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
 181 Id. 
 182 See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.  
 183 People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 128 (N.Y. 2000).  
 184 Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 962.  
 185 U.S. CONST. amend. I 
 186 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The 
right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the 
government because speech is the beginning of thought.”). 
 187 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted).  
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to the highest standard of judicial scrutiny.188 More specifically, 
“statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First 
Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a 
considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of 
expression has to give way to other compelling needs of 
society.”189 As discussed above, section 223 of the CDA was 
struck down in Reno for not meeting this standard.190 Although 
the Court in Reno conceded that the government had a 
compelling goal of “protecting minors from potentially harmful 
materials” on the Internet, it ultimately held that section 223 
was not “carefully tailored” to that goal because it was too 
vague, and its effect was to ultimately suppress “a large 
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to 
send and receive.”191 Statutes that attempt to limit free-speech 
rights may not be overly broad. 
Here, the CSDA has a potentially harmful effect on free 
speech. Just as critics of section 223 of the CDA pointed out, the 
statute would presumably affect legally acceptable speech in some 
instances, and by extension, would “chill discourse 
unacceptably.”192 Similarly, it can be argued that the CSDA would 
inevitably lead to the removal not just of illegal sex 
advertisements, but also constitutionally-protected, adult services 
advertisements. As a limit on speech, courts would subject the 
CSDA to a high level of scrutiny. In order for the CSDA to stand, 
Congress must specifically tailor its means to a compelling end. 
The reduction of instances of online sex sales that lead to 
exploitation, and sometimes violence, is a compelling justification 
for the CSDA.193 Adult prostitutes post advertisements, and third 
  
 188 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments.”). 
 189 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973). 
 190 See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844 (1997). In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court declined to articulate the exact 
standard that should apply to the Internet, with Justice Stevens remarking, “our cases 
provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied to this medium.” Id. at 870. The Court did, however, discuss whether the CDA 
was “carefully tailored” to its “goal,” which suggests a level of scrutiny akin to strict 
scrutiny. Id. at 871.  
 191 Reno, 521 U.S. at 846, 871.  
 192 HAL ABELSON, KEN LEDEEN, & HARRY LEWIS, BLOWN TO BITS: YOUR LIFE, 
LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS AFTER THE DIGITAL EXPLOSION 241 (2008).  
 193 The adult services sections of classified-ads websites are thorns “in the side 
of law enforcement agencies across the United States.” Larkin, supra note 5, at 111. 
Most importantly, online commercial sex advertisements “have recently spawned a 
string of robberies, sexual assaults, and murders.” Id. The adult services sections of 
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parties who seek to exploit minors through sex-trafficking 
arrangements also post advertisements.194 Both types of 
advertisements are illegal, and arguably unsafe. The CSDA would 
aid in reducing the instances of prostitution, and in protecting 
minors from this kind of abuse, because the posters or facilitators 
would no longer reach such a wide, readily available audience.195 
Further, the CSDA is narrowly tailored to its ultimate objective of 
combating online prostitution and sex trafficking because law 
enforcement would employ their expertise in screening adult or 
erotic services ads on classified-ads websites and would only 
encourage removal of ads that appear unlawful. The CSDA 
would not force website operators to become conservative 
screeners who would sacrifice “wide swaths of First Amendment-
protected speech”196 simply to avoid liability; the burden would be 
on law enforcement agencies to properly investigate and screen 
potential commercial sex ads. The CSDA does not target so-
called obscene materials on the Internet—an ambiguous 
category197—but rather is aimed specifically at online sex sales 
ads, which are illegal even for adults.198 In this way, the CSDA 
“describes a category of material[,] the production and 
distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection,”199 and so the amendment is not overly broad.  
Additionally, even if the CSDA had a negative effect on 
some constitutionally protected speech, and could not stand up 
to the highest level of judicial scrutiny, the Supreme Court, in 
its First Amendment cases, draws “vital distinctions between 
  
classified-ads websites further this violence, thereby endangering the safety of 
countless women and men.  
 194 See Craigslist Open Letter, supra note 44. 
 195 People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 132 (N.Y. 2000) (stating that the 
protection of children is a compelling state justification for N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22). 
 196 Matt Zimmerman, Beyond “Censored”: What Craigslist’s “Adult Services” 
Decision Means for Free Speech, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/craigslist-beyond-censored.  
 197 Obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment. See generally 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). However, the standard for obscenity, laid out 
in Miller, is fairly ambiguous, and community-specific. Id. at 24. When Congress tried 
to regulate “obscene or indecent” materials on the Internet through section 223 of the 
CDA, the Court struck the statute down on the ground of its ambiguity and vagueness. 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997). The adult advertisements on classified-ads 
websites likely do not rise to the level of obscene speech.  
 198 It is true that “[t]he Government cannot ban speech fit for adults simply 
because it may fall into the hands of children.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 
234, 252 (2002). The CSDA, however, is aimed at speech that is illegal for children and 
adults alike. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.  
 199 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (holding that New York 
Penal Law section 263.15, “Promoting a sexual performance by a child,” passes First 
Amendment scrutiny). 
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words and deeds, between ideas and conduct.”200 On this 
foundation, the government enjoys greater latitude in regulating 
conduct, rather than “pure speech.”201 The government may 
“proscribe advocacy of . . . law violation . . . where such advocacy 
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action.”202  
The CSDA proscribes the advocacy of prostitution and 
sex trafficking—forms of conduct, not pure speech. Many of the 
commercial sex advertisements on classified-ads websites lead 
to immediate lawless action and thus are not entitled to 
constitutional protection. As one law enforcement official noted, 
prostitutes and facilitators alike are using the “Internet ‘in real 
time’ to drum up customers,” telling potential customers that 
“‘[t]he girls are here right now, come quick.’”203 During one CNN 
investigation in which a reporter posted a suggestive 
advertisement on the Craigslist “Adult Services” section, the 
reporter subsequently received fifteen calls from interested men 
within three hours of posting the ad.204 In a significant number of 
advertisements in the adult or erotic services sections on 
classified-ads websites, the third-party posters extend an 
immediate invitation to engage in unlawful sexual activity,205 and 
“[a]n invitation or enticement is distinguishable from pure 
speech.”206 For this reason, the CSDA should be subject to a lesser 
  
 200 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253. 
 201 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). Thus, a “statute is 
subjected to less scrutiny where the behavior sought to be prohibited moves from ‘pure 
speech’ toward conduct.” People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 128 (N.Y. 2000) (citing 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).  
 202 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). As two legal scholars 
recently suggested, “the balance that the Court struck in Brandenburg between 
protecting speech and protecting society against the commission of unlawful acts is 
appropriate for internet communication.” Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist 
Speech and the Internet: The Continuing Importance of Brandenburg, 4 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 361, 363 (2010).  
 203 Trish Crawford, Recession Means Tough Times for Sex Workers, 
THESTAR.COM (June 7, 2009), http://www.thestar.com/living/article/646871--recession-
means-tough-times-for-sex-workers. 
 204 Lyon, supra note 4. Tellingly, all of the men who called identified 
themselves as “John,” a common name for a consumer of prostitution. Id.  
 205 See, e.g., Post 4919418Maxine, CLASSIFIEDADS.COM, http://adult.classifiedads.com/ 
erotic_services-ad4919418.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2011); Post by BRANDY, 
CLASSIFIEDADS.COM, http://adult.classifiedads.com/erotic_services-ad6169506.htm (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011); Post by Smiltholady, CLASSIFIEDADS.COM, http://adult.classifiedads.com/ 
erotic_services-ad6097327.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
 206 Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 129 (“[T]erms such as ‘procure’ or ‘solicit’ used to 
define the advancement of prostitution ([N.Y.] Penal Law § 230.15) . . . describe acts of 
communication; they do not describe the content of one’s views.”); see also United 
States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Speech attempting to 
arrange the sexual abuse of children is no more constitutionally protected than speech 
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standard of scrutiny than statutes aimed at limiting pure speech, 
and thus, should withstand First Amendment challenges.  
CONCLUSION 
The Commercial Sex Distribution Amendment would be 
an effective tool in the fight against online prostitution and sex 
trafficking. Both forms of illegal sex sales have been enormously 
transformed by the Internet, and are now more widely available 
than ever before. Currently, facilitators and prostitutes are free 
to create anonymous advertisements on classified-ads websites 
in which sex is offered in exchange for money, and the classified-
ads websites enjoy complete legal immunity for such content 
under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.207 With 
such immunity, law enforcement agencies have been unable to 
stem online sex sales at the point where it would be most 
effective—the point of distribution.208  
Although courts have declined to distinguish between 
publisher liability and distributor liability for websites that 
knowingly distribute tortious content created by third parties,209 
section 230 only explicitly immunizes interactive computer services 
from publisher liability, and stays silent on distributor liability.210 
Therefore, room remains for the imposition of distributor liability 
on websites that knowingly host illegal commercial sex 
advertisements and that is where the CSDA applies.  
With the CSDA, plaintiffs would no longer have to use 
increasingly weak litigation tactics to circumvent section 230.211 
Instead, plaintiffs, including law enforcement officials like Sheriff 
Dart, will have recourse in the statute itself with the CSDA. Armed 
with the proposed amendment, law enforcement agencies could 
more effectively combat online prostitution and sex trafficking, by 
  
attempting to arrange any other type of crime.”); Podracky v. Commonwealth, 662 
S.E.2d 81, 84 (Va. 2008) (“[N]ot all words are entitled to the protection of the First 
Amendment, and the weight of authorities in Virginia and elsewhere clearly permit the 
state to prohibit the solicitation of a crime.”). 
 207 See supra Parts II, III. 
 208 Given the end-to-end design of the Internet, regulating individual users is 
arguably an inefficient method of regulation. As various legal scholars have argued, 
targeting Internet intermediaries, such as interactive computer services, is an 
economically and socially efficient regulatory strategy. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Eric 
Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221 
(2006).  
 209 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
 210 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
 211 See supra Part III (discussing the Estoppel, Grokster, Roommates.com, and 
Default-Injunction litigation tactics). 
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focusing on the mass distributors of illegal advertisements, rather 
than the individual, anonymous posters. Law enforcement agencies 
could police the virtual Red Light District.  
Certainly, legitimate free-speech concerns have the 
potential to exist with the CSDA.212 However, the immediate 
accessibility of sex for money removes online sex sales 
advertisements from the realm of pure speech, into the area of 
conduct.213 For this reason, the CSDA should be subject to a 
lesser standard of judicial scrutiny under which the amendment 
would stand up to First Amendment challenges. Due to the 
social harms produced by online prostitution and sex 
trafficking,214 as well as the fact that both are illegal, the 
reduction of online sex sales constitutes a compelling 
justification, and the CSDA is the tool that can aid in that 
diminishment. With this tool, women and children will hopefully 
avoid “experiences of victimization, poverty, and abuse” that 
have become so prevalent through Internet sex sales.215 
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